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between government and opposition. The analysis includes the role of the Speaker, legislative 
committees, the procedure for bills, and the difficulties of mounting an effective opposition amidst 
lopsided majority governments. 
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It is said that the Newfoundland and Labrador House of Assembly has probably been the scene of more political and constitutional crises than all 
other provincial legislatures combined.1 The path to 
democratic government in Newfoundland, like many 
of its highways, has been a bumpy, winding and foggy 
journey. The European-influenced political era began 
when fishermen arrived in the late 15th century. Until 
1610 the area was “a kind of no man’s land, without law, 
religion, or government…only ruled in a rough way” 
by merchants and pirates.2 Land settlement occurred 
from the early 17th to the early 18th centuries, a period 
characterized by power struggles between fishing 
admirals and colonists, and which was followed by 
the rule of naval governors. In 1711 an assembly of the 
naval governors was convened and a code of laws was 
established. The governors were appointed by Britain 
and they ruled over the ship captains, known as fishing 
admirals, who governed fishing communities.
Political agitation by St. John’s residents such as 
William Carson in the early 19th century convinced the 
British Parliament to grant a bicameral legislature to 
the colony in 1832. Eligible male voters would now 
be able to elect 15 representatives to the lower house, 
the House of Assembly, by publicly announcing their 
choice to election officials. The governor and seven 
appointees comprised the upper house, known as the 
Legislative Council. These unelected men held political 
control and made spending decisions for the island’s 75 
thousand residents, but they were required to consider 
the views of the elected members. The nine electoral 
districts were located only on the eastern side of the 
island on the Avalon, Bonavista and Burin peninsulas.
The formation of the House of Assembly presents an 
interesting question: when democracy is first achieved 
but there is not yet a legislative building where do the 
members meet? The answer and the many subsequent 
movements of the Assembly symbolize developments 
in Newfoundland politics.
From the outset Newfoundland’s representative 
government was disorganized and haphazard. The 
first session of the legislature was held in 1833 in 
a St. John’s tavern and lodging house (across from 
the current war memorial). The appointed council, 
appropriately enough, met on the upper floor and the 
elected representatives gathered on the ground floor. 
However the establishment’s operator, Mary Travers, 
was not paid her monthly rent. As the story goes, she 
proceeded to sell the Speaker’s chair, a desk and the 
sergeant-at-arms’ regalia including the mace, sword, 
suit and hat at an auction.3
The second session convened that same year at 
another location, the Old Court House. However, 
not only was it too small, but proceedings had to be 
delayed because the legislature needed papers that had 
been stored in the desk taken by Travers, which the 
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tavern operator refused to return unless she was paid 
for five months’ rent. She was eventually compensated 
without apparently disclosing that the desk, and thus 
the papers, had in fact been sold. Many of the items 
were eventually bought back from the purchaser and 
meetings continued in the Old Court House while a 
permanent building was being planned and erected.
The bicameral legislature lasted for a decade. Initially, 
the lower house was “a very respectful body”, but the 
Legislative Council and elected officials “immediately 
disagreed” over even “trivial details”, and both houses 
proved to be uncompromising.4 This contributed to 
inciting religious, class and partisan clashes including 
rioting during elections and many legislative deadlocks; 
electoral districts, after all, had been distributed on the 
basis of residents’ religious denomination.5 Due to all 
the feuding Britain suspended the Newfoundland 
constitution in 1842 and combined the appointed and 
elected members into a unicameral legislature.
The Amalgamated Assembly began meeting in 1843, 
with 10 appointed members of the Legislative Council 
sitting with 15 elected representatives, and the council 
continuing to retain executive powers. This was far 
more productive but residents’ desires for responsible 
government persisted and in 1846 a petition was sent 
to Britain requesting as much. That same year, the Old 
Court House was destroyed by one of several fires that 
would consume St. John’s, forcing the legislature to 
convene for two years at an orphan asylum. That is, 
until the orphanage’s operators ejected the legislators 
so that the space could be again used for classrooms.
The unicameral experiment lasted only half a 
decade. In 1848 Britain re-established separate lower 
and upper houses, but rejected requests for responsible 
government, believing that the colony was unprepared 
for this development. For the next two years assembly 
meetings were held in a building owned by one of the 
members of the legislature. Finally, in 1850, sessions 
could be convened in the newly constructed Colonial 
Building on Military Road in St. John’s. Nearly a 
century later, tobacco smoke would have to be removed 
from ceiling frescos during a restoration effort, 
and the neo-classical structure would be declared 
“Newfoundland’s most important public building”6 
for its design and especially its political history. 
Responsible Government
Responsible government emerged in the colony of 
Newfoundland in 1855 which meant that the political 
executive would be accountable to the Assembly. 
The administrators of government (‘cabinet’) would 
now largely be elected MHAs, including the first 
premier (Philip Francis Little), a colonial secretary, 
a receiver general and a surveyor general. These 
men were technically subservient to an appointed 
governor and their business was scrutinized by a 
12-member appointed Legislative Council; Britain 
remained in control of international affairs. Thirty 
MHAs represented 15 districts, mostly coastal, and by 
now extending to the southwest of the island which 
contained about 124 thousand residents. 
Despite the arrival of responsible government, 
political and religious fighting persisted in both the 
bicameral legislature and in public. Factions squared 
off during elections and in 1861 soldiers shot at the 
St. John’s rioters who had initially surrounded the 
Colonial Building, killing three of them. Nevertheless 
residents were unified by a developing Newfoundland 
identity and they bristled at the idea of a formal union of 
British North America’s colonies. Two Newfoundland 
delegates participated in the 1864 Quebec conference 
on confederation but there were concerns about 
the terms of union. In 1869, two years after Ontario, 
Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had united 
as the Dominion of Canada, pro-confederation 
candidates were soundly defeated in a general election 
in Newfoundland, formally signalling the public’s 
rejection of a union with Canada. 
Political frustrations inevitably arose between 
Newfoundland, Canada and Britain, particularly 
over the colony’s desire to sign a trade pact with the 
United States. Once again there were internal tensions. 
In 1886 a mob seeking employment on the railway 
broke into the Colonial Building chamber and in 1874 
Newfoundland’s financial institutions crashed, and 
Meeting Places of the House of Assembly
Location (years) Reason for Vacating Political Events at 
Time of Move
St. John’s Tavern (1833) Rent not paid Representative 
government just 
granted
St. John’s Court House 
(1833-1846)
Destroyed by fire Petitioning for 
responsible 
government
Orphan Asylum School 
(1846-1848)
Classrooms needed Reestablishment of 
bicameral legislature
Water Street Building 
owned by MHA (1848-
1850)





New building ready Post-Confederation 
growth
Confederation Building, 
floors 9 & 10 (1960-1991)
Lack of fire exits Year before cod 
moratorium
Confederation Building, 
floors 2 & 3 (1991 - 
present)
– –
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were replaced with Canadian banks, but there was still 
opposition to joining Canada. Newfoundland took 
another step to move beyond its colonial status when it 
became a semi-autonomous British dominion in 1907. 
When Britain’s Statute of Westminster took effect in 1931 
the Dominion of Newfoundland, as with the Dominion 
of Canada, was granted legal freedom from British laws 
where it so chose. However the legislature, unlike in 
Canada, did not adopt the Statute and therefore seemed 
content to be subservient to the British Parliament. At 
the time Newfoundland politicians were preoccupied 
with addressing a crippling post-war debt at the onset 
of the Great Depression. Newfoundlanders needed 
political leadership, stability and vision. What they got 
was political scandal.
One hundred years after Newfoundland had been 
granted the right to elect political representatives, 
its Minister of Finance, Peter Cashin, resigned. He 
publicly alleged that Prime Minister Richard Squires 
and the cabinet had been pocketing public money and 
falsifying minutes of council. This “crucial moment” in 
1932 was the start of a chain of events that would lead to the 
collapse of responsible government.7 The scandal brewed 
for months until a large mob stormed and ransacked the 
Colonial Building. The prime minister hid in the basement 
and only evaded harm by running through a residence, 
over some fences and into a taxi. It is less well known 
that the mace and the sergeant-at-arms’ sword once again 
disappeared though, as with the Mary Travers incident, 
they were eventually returned. Newfoundland’s politics, 
like its finances, was in shambles.
Commission of Government
In response to this untenable economic situation, 
Britain formed the Amulree Royal Commission. The 
Commission’s report into the colony’s politics and 
finances predicted “imminent” bankruptcy8 and 
determined that Newfoundland “required a rest from 
politics”. In 1933 a Committee of the Whole (that is, all 
members sitting as a committee presided over by the 
deputy Speaker) in the House of Assembly decided to 
request an end to both responsible and representative 
government. The Newfoundland constitution would 
again be suspended and replaced with another system 
of government. The MHAs’ decision met little public 
resistance. With that, democracy in the colony regressed 
by a century, and Newfoundland became “probably 
the only country in the world that voluntarily gave up 
self-government”.9
Thus in 1934 Newfoundland again became a dependent 
territory with a colonial administration, known as the 
Commission of Government, ruling over the colony’s 
approximately 290 thousand residents. Britain was 
now responsible for the colony’s debt, which was so 
large that interest payments were absorbing over half 
of Newfoundland’s annual revenues. The unelected 
commission comprised three British bureaucrats who 
headed the government’s economic departments and three 
Newfoundlanders who headed up social departments. It 
was chaired by the governor, who could also vote. There 
were inevitably some policy disputes and after some conflict 
and turnover only commissioners who would introduce 
locally palatable economic reforms were appointed.10 As 
Newfoundland-born political scientist Henry Bertram 
Mayo observed, the Commission of Government was “a 
unique experiment” in the politics of the Commonwealth:
…there can be few examples in the world of a 
freely elected legislature, backed overwhelmingly 
by public opinion, subscribing frankly to the 
doctrines that democracy is less important than 
debt obligations, and that good government 
is preferable to self-government. Surely we 
may legitimately expect this experience of 
Newfoundland to give us some useful lessons on 
how to work democracy successfully…during its 
period of benevolent dictatorship.11
The need for such “benevolent dictatorship” waned 
as the government’s budgets improved. However, 
London was unconvinced that Newfoundland was 
ready to have its constitution reinstated, and urged 
local discussion on the matter. At the end of the 
Second World War, and for the first time in a dozen 
years, Newfoundlanders were given the opportunity 
to vote. In 1946, they elected 45 delegates to a national 
convention based in St. John’s, where representatives 
would deliberate options for forms of government that 
would seek majority support in a national referendum. 
Emotional debates ensued in the Colonial Building for 
the next 17 months. Interestingly, members occasionally 
behaved as though they had formed a government, for 
example in attempting to negotiate trade deals.
Two divisive national referendums on Newfoundland’s 
political future would ultimately lead to a weak endorsement 
of finally joining Canada. The first referendum was held 
in June 1948: 44.6 per cent voted for a return to the 1933 
version of government, 41.1 per cent chose confederation 
with Canada, and some 14.3 per cent opted for a five-
year continuation of the Commission of Government. 
Since no option obtained a 50 percent majority, a second 
referendum on the top two choices was held in July 1948, 
with radio personality Joey Smallwood advocating union 
with Canada and former Minister of Finance Peter Cashin 
leading the anti-confederates. This time, the outcome 
was 52.3 per cent voting for confederation with Canada 
and 47.7 per cent voting for 1933’s version of responsible 
government. On March 31, 1949 Newfoundland became 
Canada’s 10th province. Representative and responsible 
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government would reappear, but economic and political 
frustrations would persist.
The national referendums marked the first time that 
Labradorians were eligible to vote. Since 1809 Labrador 
has been under Newfoundland’s authority, which was 
confirmed in a 1927 British court ruling, though the 
colony did subsequently try to sell Labrador to Canada. 
The massive land area was so sparsely populated, with 
just 4,000 residents in 1901,12 that Labradorians would 
not elect their first MHA until Newfoundland joined 
Canada. 
The Present-day House of Assembly
In joining Canada, Newfoundland maintained its 
valued ties to Britain, even while transferring some of 
its political and economic powers to mainland Canada. 
The British monarch, and his or her representatives, 
continued to be the formal executive but some 
political responsibilities, such as defence and offshore 
activities, shifted from London and from St. John’s to a 
federal government based in Ottawa. Newfoundlanders 
were, and are, represented in Parliament by seven elected 
Members of Parliament (MPs) and by six appointed 
senators. As is the case in other provinces, the provincial 
government and the members of its unicameral House of 
Assembly are responsible largely for the administration 
of social matters such as health care and education.
Formally, the lieutenant governor wields executive 
power, as that person represents the Crown for 
provincial purposes. In practice, as in all provinces 
these powers are only used upon the advice of the first 
minister, an indirectly elected premier. The lieutenant 
governor opens and ends (‘prorogues’) sessions of the 
legislature; dissolves it, thereby requiring an election; 
endorses cabinet directives to make them official (as 
‘Governor-in-Council’); and signs bills (‘Royal Assent’) 
the final step in making them statutes (laws). He (no 
woman has ever served as lieutenant governor) 
performs ceremonial functions, such as reading the 
Speech from the Throne in the House of Assembly 
chamber at the start of each new session to identify 
the government’s legislative and policy priorities; 
swears in cabinet ministers; awards medals; attends 
ceremonies; and addresses public gatherings. This 
includes hosting an annual public garden party at the 
lieutenant governor’s official residence, Government 
House, on Military Road.
MHAs who belong to cabinet are the ones who 
collectively make government policy decisions and 
who individually oversee government departments and 
agencies, though the premier’s office is often engaged in 
departmental affairs. In particular, Premiers Smallwood 
(Liberal, 1949-1972), Frank Moores (PC, 1972-1979), 
Brian Peckford (PC, 1979-1989), Clyde Wells (Liberal, 
1989-1995), Brian Tobin (Liberal, 1995-2000), and Danny 
Williams (PC, 2003-2010) have been charismatic populists 
who have themselves been likened to benevolent 
dictators.
The House is usually in session in the spring and 
fall, sitting on Mondays, Tuesdays and Thursdays 
from 1:30pm to 5:30pm and on Wednesdays from 
2pm to 5pm. MHAs typically convene from early 
March until an Easter break and then until mid-May, 
and again in the autumn for four to six weeks which 
usually includes November. The parliamentary duties 
of members may include delivering statements in 
the chamber of the legislature, presenting petitions, 
attending debates, voting on bills and participating in 
committees. Their extra-parliamentary work includes 
attempting to resolve issues for constituents by liaising 
with applicable government offices and performing 
ceremonial roles such as delivering speeches at local 
events,13 to such an extent that they inevitably act as 
“ombudsman, social worker, legal advocate and even 
father-confessor”.
The business of the legislature has been in decline. 
The number of annual sitting days gradually increased 
after Confederation, peaking at an average of 80 days 
a year in the 1980s, but it has since returned to 1950s 
levels and averaged less than 44 days annually from 
2000 to 2009.14 One explanation is that a daily stipend 
for rural members was discontinued in the mid-
1990s and consequently they now prefer expediency. 
Another explanation is that the parties, leaders, 
ministers and MHAs have adopted open line radio as a 
preferred medium for communicating public concerns 
such that the call sign of radio station VOCM has been 
dubbed by journalists as an acronym for “voice of the 
cabinet minister”.15 Furthermore unless there is an 
active legislative agenda the premier avoids providing 
an institutional forum for opposition. Even then House 
attendance is not ideal so that a recently adopted rule 
specifies that members, other than party leaders, who 
fail to attend sittings without a valid reason, are to be 
penalized $200 per day. To date this penalty is observed 
rather than enforced because it is up to members to 
self-declare their absence.
The spring session is dominated by budget issues 
and is therefore the most integral to the government’s 
operation. In approximately mid-March the Minister 
of Finance delivers a budget to which many MHAs 
may speak, sometimes multiple times if there are 
amendments. Over the next three weeks the estimates 
of expenditures for each government department and 
agency are examined by three standing committees, 
which report back to the House, and whose reports 
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are debated. By March 31, the end of the fiscal year, 
if the main supply bill has not yet been passed then 
an interim supply bill must be passed so that the 
government can access short-term funding to continue 
its operations. By comparison, the fall session tends 
to be characterized by the government’s legislative 
business, such as debating bills and issues of the day.
Members who do not belong to cabinet have a small 
influence on public policy and have a more limited 
legislative presence than is the case in other provinces. 
In other parliamentary systems, members introduce 
a private member’s bill to propose legislation in an 
attempt to raise public awareness of issues and to 
hold the government to account. In Newfoundland, 
non-cabinet members may speak for 15 minutes on 
Wednesdays (the designated private members day) 
when they can introduce motions, which could include 
urging policy change. But unlike other legislatures, the 
rules for a private member’s bill require completion of 
all three readings in the same day, and the resulting 
impossibility of meeting such a stringent requirement 
is symbolic of the strength of the political executive 
and the lack of effective opposition. Consequently a 
private member’s bill has never been passed.
Members of a legislature require coordination for 
business to be carried out efficiently. This organizational 
responsibility falls to each House leader who coordinates 
his or her political party’s daily business in the legislature. 
Each morning the government House leader meets with 
the other House leader(s) to identify what the governing 
party hopes to accomplish that day. There is negotiation 
and cooperation so that all parties are aware in advance of 
the planned proceedings, as outlined on the Order Paper 
which itemizes the day’s agenda for the House when 
it is sitting. For instance, the government House leader 
will propose that a bill be dealt with earlier because the 
sponsoring minister is planning an out-of-town business 
trip, to which the opposition House leaders will usually 
agree unless they feel the need for more time to research 
the subject matter. It is rare for the government House 
leader to be obstinate in part because the opposition will 
react by making life difficult for the governing party, 
by stalling its legislative programme or in other ways. 
Nevertheless the opposition will, at times, be told that 
some business has to be dealt with expeditiously. As one 
MHA put it, “If you didn’t have that behind the scenes 
cooperation on a daily basis—on an hourly basis when 
the House is open—the House wouldn’t work.”
House leaders must therefore be trustworthy and 
be prepared to act as their parties’ spokespersons on 
procedural matters. They also work within their party 
with the “Whip”, an MHA who is appointed by the 
party leader to ensure that MHAs attend and vote 
as directed. Party discipline is severe, particularly 
for government members, to such an extent that the 
premier’s office may coordinate an intense public 
attack on any dissenters. Elected officials therefore 
tend to express constituents’ concerns in private but 
voice the position of the party in public. Quorum is 14 
MHAs plus the Speaker.
The Newfoundland legislature also includes six 
statutory offices. The Citizens’ Representative— the 
equivalent to the Ombudsman in other provinces—
investigates public concerns with the government after 
all other manners of appeal have been pursued.16 The 
Office of the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) administers 
Representation in Canadian Provinces (April 2010) 
Province # Members # Female Members Constituents 
(mean)*




Ontario 107 29 122,752 88.0 $116,550
Québec 125 36 62,960 69.6 $100,371
British Columbia 85 25 52,873 59.1 $101,859
Alberta 83 17 44,721 52.6 $78,138
Manitoba 57 18 21,561 64.2 $85,564
Nova Scotia 52 12 18,091 50.7 $86,619
Saskatchewan 58 13 17,897 68.1 $87,195
New Brunswick 55 6 13,648 64.2 $85,000
Newfoundland and Labrador 48 10 10,642 43.5 $102,984
Prince Edward Island 27 7 5,231 42.4 $63,750
Total 697 173 48,681 60.2 $90,803
Sources: Parliament of Canada, Statistics Canada, Members’ Compensation Review Committee
*Ratio of provincial members to provincial population as of January 1, 2010
**Includes tax-free allowances
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provincial elections, including election finance disclosure, 
through Elections Newfoundland and Labrador. The 
CEO is also typically the Commissioner for Legislative 
Standards who maintains ethical standards in the 
legislature, such as directing MHAs to complete asset 
disclosure statements. The Office of the Information and 
Privacy Commissioner examines complaints related to 
access to information and privacy protection. The Office 
of the Auditor General audits the government accounts 
and financial statements and delivers reports to the 
House about all entities of the provincial government, 
including departments, Crown agencies and Memorial 
University of Newfoundland. A newer addition, the 
Office of the Child and Youth Advocate, promotes the 
interests of children to the government. 
Canadian cabinets are often selected on the basis 
of social characteristics, including geography, 
rather than strictly on merit. This was certainly the 
case in Newfoundland during the Smallwood era 
when he endeavored to maintain a religious balance 
in his cabinets but by the Peckford era religious 
denomination was no longer a significant social 
criterion in appointments. Today religion has no 
evident role in the executive or legislative branches of 
government whatsoever, other than in the provincial 
motto Quaerite Prime Regnum Dei or, “Seek Ye First the 
Kingdom of God”. 
Though the Conservative and Liberal parties have 
dominated Newfoundland politics a number of 
political parties have competed for votes over the years. 
During the late 19th century political and religious 
alignments roughly followed socio-economic divisions, 
with St. John’s business elites identifying with the 
Conservatives, and less wealthy rural residents with 
the Liberals. Other pre-Confederation labels emerged, 
such as the People’s party, the Unionist party, and the 
United Newfoundland party, but all parties went into 
hibernation during the Commission of Government era 
when there were no elections to contest. The provincial 
(Progressive) Conservative and Liberal parties that 
materialized in 1949 were cousins of their Canadian 
namesakes and have been so similar ideologically 
that crossing the floor is not uncommon. Other post-
Confederation political organizations such as the 
United Newfoundland Party, the New Labrador Party, 
the Liberal Reform Party and lately the New Democratic 
Party (NDP) have not threatened the party duopoly. As 
of 2010, the Liberal and NDP organizations enjoy a close 
relationship with their federal counterparts; conversely 
the PC party’s ties with the federal Conservatives are 
so weak that Premier Williams orchestrated an ‘ABC’ 
(‘anything but Conservative’) campaign against the 
Harper government during the 2008 federal election. 
The widespread support that Newfoundland’s populist 
leaders enjoy indicates that, to varying degrees, 
members of all socio-demographic groups rally behind 
their premiers.
Increasingly the presence of women in Newfoundland 
politics is scrutinized. In 1925, the suffrage movement 
achieved the right for women to vote, though this 
had already been conferred across Canada, except 
in Quebec and the Northwest Territories. The first 
female MHA, Helena Squires (wife of Newfoundland 
Prime Minister Squires), won a 1930 by-election but the 
dominance of men in Newfoundland politics was such 
that it would be 45 years before another woman would 
be elected to the House. The first woman elected in the 
Confederation era was Liberal Hazel McIsaac (in 1975). 
Lynn Verge established a number of benchmarks by 
becoming one of the first female cabinet ministers (with 
PC Hazel Newhook in 1979), the first female Minister 
of Justice (1985), the first female Deputy Premier (in 
1989) and the first female PC leader (in 1995). Liberal 
Joan Marie Aylward became the first female Minister 
of Health (in 1997) and first female finance minister (in 
2001). PC Kathy Dunderdale became the province’s first 
female Premier (in late 2010).
Officially, Liberal Wally Anderson was the first 
Aboriginal MHA (elected in 1996) and the first to be 
appointed to cabinet (in 2003). It is widely thought that 
he was preceded by PC Joe Goudie, a Labradorian who 
was elected in 1975 and appointed to cabinet in 1979; 
the discrepancy appears to be that Métis did not have 
special legal status at that time and that Goudie did 
not self-identify as such.17 The youngest MHA was Bill 
Rowe, who was 24 years old when elected in 1966 and, 
at 26 years, he became one of Canada’s youngest cabinet 
ministers. The first Newfoundland-born francophone, 
PC Tony Cornect, was elected in 2007 and at least one 
openly declared lesbian, Gemma Schlamp-Hickey, has 
run for office (in 2007 with the NDP). 
The occupational background of members has 
been changing. During the struggle for responsible 
government MHAs tended to be businessmen and 
lawyers, though that did not necessarily mean they 
were wealthy. Today, MHAs are more likely to have 
been teachers, municipal politicians or office assistants 
(including former political staffers), and about half of 
MHAs have post-secondary education. The presence 
of family connections has been slowly changing too. 
In the 19th century Newfoundland politics was “built on 
a foundation of elite family participation;”18 nearly half of 
legislative councillors and members of the executive were 
closely related to each other, and about a quarter of House 
of Assembly representatives were related. These tended 
to be fathers, sons and brothers, as well as members 
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related by marriage. Representation is more diverse today 
though family connections persist. In 1997, PC MHAs 
Sheila and Tom Osborne became the first mother and son 
to sit simultaneously in a Canadian legislature, and six 
years later they were joined by her brother, Bob Ridgley, 
meaning that in 2010 three of the five St. John’s-named 
seats continued to be held by members of the same family.
Relationship between Government and Opposition
Daily business in the House follows parliamentary 
procedures, the most notable of which are the 
Standing Orders—the formal rules of the House—
which are enforced by the Speaker. This MHA follows 
standardized practices in attempting to maintain 
order in the House including during debates. Though 
elected as a member of a political party, the Speaker 
behaves in a non-partisan manner, and does not vote 
in the legislature unless there is a tie. Since 1999 a 
standing order has specified that MHAs use a secret 
ballot to elect the Speaker. This first occurred in 2003. 
A deputy Speaker, who is appointed by the premier, 
performs duties that the Speaker is unavailable for and 
is likewise assisted by a deputy chair of committees.
Decorum in the House varies, though it is not 
noticeably better or worse than in other Canadian 
chambers. Members are supposed to talk directly 
to the Speaker and therefore indirectly to another 
member. MHAs tend to preface their remarks with 
“Mr. Speaker,” but they typically face the member they 
are speaking to and regularly swivel in their seats so 
that their backs are to the Speaker, which personalizes 
the debate. There is a dress code, with men having to 
wear dress shirts and neckties, and though food is not 
allowed members often snack discretely. Occasionally 
props, such as an opposition member placing dog food 
on a minister’s desk, and other such shenanigans occur. 
Members are allowed to use portable electronic devices 
when Orders of the Day are called, as long as they do not 
receive calls or otherwise disrupt proceedings, though 
occasionally some pretend to tie their shoes while 
speaking on the phone. Generally this allows MHAs to 
communicate with their staff and improves the speed at 
which ministers can have documents delivered to them. 
Laptops are also permitted but are rarely used, perhaps 
because there are currently no wireless Internet facilities 
other than for handheld devices.
If there is an audience in the gallery and/or if a party 
leader is not present some members may be more 
prone to heckle off-camera. A senior member may 
subtly direct a junior member to jeer an opponent and 
MHAs routinely thump on their desks. Hansard—the 
verbatim transcript of House proceedings—politely 
records such verbal feistiness as “Hear, hear!” or “Oh, 
oh!” which is often followed by the Speaker saying, 
“Order please!” Hansard does not record the laughter 
which can often be heard from the public galleries and 
inevitably from the Speaker himself. For members 
such banter tends to be a welcome interruption to 
the monotony of chamber business. Short witty 
interruptions with double-entendres are generally 
welcomed by all; but mean-spirited shouting with the 
intent of muzzling a recognized speaker is usually 
seen as unacceptable.
The most contentious event since the House of 
Assembly moved to the Confederation Building 
occurred on May 27, 1971, when it “devolved into 
chaos”.19 In an evening meeting the PC leader, Bill 
Marshall, read a news report that identified Premier 
Smallwood’s wife as a slum landlord. In response 
Liberal MHA Bill Smallwood, the premier’s son, 
punched Marshall in the face. Bill Smallwood was 
suspended from the House for seven days; other 
members, including Bill Marshall and John Crosbie, 
were suspended or walked out around this time too. 
The documentation of proceedings has changed 
significantly in recent years. Hansard was not publicly 
available during most of the 1960s when reporters 
relied upon a voice recording system. Until relatively 
recently citizens could only hear MHAs on the radio or 
hear them on television “with their voices played over 
still photographs, freeze frames or sketches”.20 Using 
the Saskatchewan legislature as a model, the House 
undertook changes to televise proceedings. Since 
November 2001, five robotic cameras in the chamber 
have enabled live broadcasts on cable television, and 
since March 2009 this video has been accessible on 
the House of Assembly website.21 This has greatly 
increased citizens’ ability to observe proceedings 
which tend to be more professional now that members 
are mindful that they may be seen in their constituents’ 
living rooms. As one member remarked:
It’s unreal the number of people that watch 
this at home…Hundreds, literally hundreds, 
of people in my district say, “I saw you on TV 
the other night.” They watch the stuff. For some 
people, it’s their soap opera, and they watch it.
To help maintain order the Speaker is assisted by the 
Clerk of the House who oversees the operations of the 
legislature. The Clerk provides advice on parliamentary 
procedure and supervises the administration of 
legislative business, such as the preparation of the Order 
Paper. Approximately 35 staff report to the Clerk, of 
whom 18 deal with information services (including four 
in the legislative library, three for broadcast services and 
nine for Hansard transcripts of debates) and 17 handle 
financial duties (such as accounting, financial reporting, 
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purchasing, human resources and payroll). A Clerk 
assistant and a law clerk provide procedural and legal 
support, while the sergeant-at-arms is responsible for 
security and public tours. 
As with any legislature, at times demonstrators 
occupy the lobby, shout down proceedings in the 
chamber or block the entrances. Though precautions 
have increased after the September 2001 U.S. terrorist 
attacks, the House of Assembly remains quite accessible. 
There are no restrictions on vehicles’ proximity to the 
building, employees swipe an identification card upon 
entry and visitors are signed in at friendly security 
desks. It is only when attempting to access the public 
galleries to view chamber proceedings that people are 
required to pass through a metal detector.
Committees are one of the most important institutions of a 
parliamentary legislature. These are the quasi-public forums 
where small groups of members, particularly backbenchers, 
can scrutinize government business. Committee chairs 
oversee meetings and are tasked with reporting back to the 
House; they are selected by its membership and are usually 
government MHAs. Legislative committees thus act as a 
check on the political executive – which explains why they 
are so inconspicuous in Newfoundland.
A committee of the whole house includes all MHAs 
present in the chamber and is by far the most prevalent 
type of committee in Newfoundland. However this is 
not really a committee given that it is a meeting of all 
members who wish to attend. It is chaired by the deputy 
Speaker who allows members to speak multiple times 
about the details of proposed legislation. Typically 
this includes examining the budget estimates of 
expenditure for the legislature, for the executive 
council and for the consolidated revenue fund. Unlike 
standing and special committees, the committee of the 
whole is not permitted to hear from witnesses, nor can 
it engage in other forms of public participation. 
There are several types of specialist committees in 
the House of Assembly. After each election a striking 
committee of five MHAs is formed to identify members 
to serve on the seven standing committees. The most 
integral, but underutilized, are the government 
services committee, the resource committee and the 
social services committee, each of which comprised 
seven MHAs and is responsible for scrutinizing 
roughly five departments. For decades, the emphasis 
of these three committees has been on reviewing every 
department’s proposed expenditures each spring. 
Shortly after the budget has been delivered in the 
House the minister of the department or agency whose 
estimates are being scrutinized is accompanied to the 
committee meeting by the deputy minister, assistant 
deputy ministers, communications director and/or 
other department personnel. Research staff from the 
opposition offices may attend as well. For about three 
hours questions are answered by department officials, 
after which participants might go out for a meal 
together, though that practice has been waning. On 
occasion amendments are recommended. 
The minimalist existence of legislative committees, 
and the presence of one or more ministers on some 
such committees, speaks to the lack of independent 
scrutiny of the executive branch’s decisions. In many 
parliamentary systems such groups of members closely 
review draft legislation after second reading before it 
is referred back to the House. In Newfoundland, bills 
are immediately referred to committee of the whole, 
and the last time legislation was referred to standing 
committees was in late 2001.22 Furthermore these 
committees do not tend to solicit outsiders’ opinions 
in part because the small size of the Newfoundland 
community is such that expert witnesses are reluctant 
to publicly critique the government.23 Matters are 
instead discussed in a meeting of a committee of the 
whole House which is more inclusive but far less 
specialized. The presence of opposition party leaders 
and sometimes ministers reduces the opportunity for 
non-partisan study, limits backbench MHAs’ ability 
to gain expertise or question their party’s policies, and 
increases the likelihood of televised posturing. 
One premier’s attempt to address this parliamentary 
flaw was unsuccessful. During the Peckford era 
committee work was weakened by the shuffling 
around of committee membership; by the opposition 
experiencing difficulty devoting MHAs; and by 
members being less likely to attend if they believed that 
there would be no media interest. In 1989 Premier Wells 
instructed that standing committees be used to scrutinize 
legislation, which included the calling of witnesses. 
However within a few years this practice fell into disuse 
and the practice of stakeholders meeting privately 
with department executives returned. Consequently 
the scope of the government services, the resource and 
the social services committees returned to foremost 
being a brief annual review of the budget and so they 
have become known as simply ‘estimates committees’. 
These committees meet so rarely that an MHA who is 
promoted to Cabinet will remain as a member until 
annual adjustments are made in preparation for the 
committee’s review of the budget estimates. The media 
rarely pays attention to such work.
Other standing committees include select and special 
committees that investigate matters as directed by the 
House and which cease to exist after they deliver their 
reports. Meetings of these committees are uncommon. 
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The public accounts committee (seven members), which 
is traditionally chaired by an opposition MHA, reviews 
the Auditor General’s annual report and spending by 
the House and looks into related financial matters. 
The standing orders committee (five members) meets 
privately as needed to review the procedural rules of 
the legislature. The privileges and elections committee 
(minimum four members) rarely meets; it deals with 
matters relating to the freedom of MHAs, including 
the development of a code of conduct, though these 
meetings are also behind closed doors. There are 
also provisions for a miscellaneous and private bills 
committee, if needed, to discuss emerging matters that 
may not otherwise be referred to a committee. None of 
the province’s standing committees meets more than 
seven days a year24 though, as political scientist Susan 
McCorquodale observed, this lack of activity does not 
necessarily mean “that the committees are useless”.25
Currently the most watched statutory body is 
the House of Assembly management commission. 
The commission is responsible for the House’s 
administrative and financial policies. This committee 
is comprised of the Speaker (the chair), the Clerk (a 
non-voting position) and six MHAs, including the 
two main parties’ house leaders and the member of a 
third political party if one is represented in the House. 
Importantly, its proceedings are public and are both 
televised and webcast. Furthermore the latest activities 
of the commission are available on the House’s 
website, as are MHAs’ expense reports. MHAs and 
their staff are also provided with a Members’ Resources 
and Allowances Rules Manual that details procedures 
for filing expense claims and associated allowances. 
The management commission is assisted by an audit 
committee, which meets at least four times a year to 
review internal spending controls, such as the audit 
plans of the Auditor General. That committee is 
composed of two commission MHAs, one of whom 
must be an opposition MHA, and of two non-MHAs 
who are chosen by the province’s Chief Justice.
Events in the House of Assembly, when it is sitting, 
follow a daily pattern.26 Each day there are eight routine 
proceedings that occur in the same order. Activities 
begin with statements by members, which are 
60-second announcements by MHAs about something 
in their district, such as congratulatory messages to 
constituents or noteworthy local events. For instance 
an MHA may announce that he attended the annual 
banquet of a swim team; one may congratulate the 
builders of a memorial park; and another may praise 
her brother for winning a volunteer award.27 This is 
followed by statements by ministers, which tend to be 
remarks on government policy, and to which the opposition 
is given time to respond. These are typically attempts by 
ministers to bring attention to issues that might otherwise 
go unnoticed, such as announcing funding for an energy-
efficient interpretation centre, or providing an update on 
the expansion of broadband Internet in rural areas. As an 
unofficial courtesy the minister’s office provides opposition 
critics with a copy of the statement immediately beforehand 
so that critics can quickly prepare a response.
Such statements are humdrum affairs compared to 
the 30-minute spectacle that follows. Since the modern 
daily oral question period was established in 1972 it has 
become a theatrical event where opposition MHAs put 
questions to ministers who either respond in a positive 
manner or avoid a direct answer. This event attracts 
the greatest attendance from ‘strangers’, including 
the journalists who peer down from the press gallery, 
political staffers, bureaucrats and members of the 
public seated in the public viewing galleries. Notably, 
attendance among the MHAs themselves, especially 
ministers, also peaks during question period. Many of 
these people, including members, tend to shuffle out of 
the chamber as soon as the Speaker announces that the 
time for oral questions has expired. 
Often the queries during question period are predictable 
because they reflect issues that were in the morning news 
or on talk radio; they may address concerns uncovered in 
the ‘estimates committees’; it may even be that a friendly 
opposition MHA, who prefers a productive outcome 
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over scoring political points, has informed a minister in 
advance of the question. This is the forum from which 
political reporters take their cue as they gather in a scrum 
area adjacent to the chamber entrance and summon select 
MHAs, usually beginning with the premier.
While the media scrum is being organized the next 
proceeding is already underway in the chamber. The 
presentation of reports by committees is the opportunity 
for a committee chair to table a report from his or her 
committee and to make a brief statement about it. The 
tabling of documents, wherein ministers formally share 
reports and studies, follows. Next, notices of motion 
are made so that MHAs are informed in advance of 
significant upcoming motions, such as the planned 
introduction of a bill. This is followed by answers to 
questions for which notice has been given, wherein 
ministers address matters placed on the Order Paper or 
table written responses. The final proceeding is petitions, 
during which members present petitions signed by 
citizens on issues of concern; an MHA presenting a 
petition is given three minutes to speak to the issue.
How does an election campaign promise become a 
bill and then law? When the governing party, through 
cabinet, determines that it wishes to introduce, amend 
or repeal a law then the matter is referred for study by 
ministers in the corresponding cabinet committee (such 
as economic policy, social policy, or the planning and 
priorities committee). In these committees ministers 
are tasked with examining proposed legislation or 
policies, often with support from bureaucrats in 
the relevant department(s) and from the cabinet 
secretariat. At times they invite delegations to deliver 
presentations and occasionally they hold meetings 
around the province. The ministers then refer a bill 
back to cabinet for approval before it can be introduced 
in the legislature by the relevant minister. Cabinet 
committees are far more active and functional than 
are the legislative committees which are comprised 
primarily of non-cabinet MHAs.
In the parliamentary system of government a bill passes 
through three distinct stages in the legislative chamber 
before it can be endorsed by the Crown and thus become 
law. Once notice has been given, a minister may introduce 
the bill for distribution to MHAs and the public at ‘first 
reading’. Discussion and debate occur during ‘second 
reading’. Here the proposing minister may speak for up to 
an hour, as may the opposition MHA who replies directly. 
Other MHAs are allowed to speak for up to 20 minutes 
about the bill, after which the minister has the opportunity 
to speak again, ending the debate.
The rules permit standing committees to scrutinize 
bills, and to propose and debate amendments, both 
before these are introduced at first reading or after 
second reading. This is rare in Newfoundland and 
instead the clauses of the bill are typically examined by 
the committee of the whole house (which means that 
all MHAs present may speak multiple times). If the 
bill is endorsed by a majority of MHAs present, and 
if it has not been sent back to a standing committee, 
it then moves on to ‘third reading’. This is a final 
vote that is largely a formality and one that does not 
usually involve supplementary debate or further 
amendments. Having passed third reading the bill is 
sent to the lieutenant governor for signature to receive 
Royal Assent and thus become law.
As elsewhere in Canada members are elected under 
the single member plurality (SMP) electoral system, 
whereby the winner in an electoral district needs only 
one vote more than the runner-up. This can result in the 
legislature being thoroughly dominated by members 
of the governing party, as with recent cases in British 
Columbia, Alberta, and New Brunswick, but unlike in 
some provinces there has never been a serious effort 
to change the system in Newfoundland. The main 
check on the political executive is the responsible 
government convention that if the government loses 
a “confidence” vote in the legislature it must either 
resign to permit another government to take its place 
or (more frequently) to advise the lieutenant governor 
to dissolve the House and hold an election. In line with 
other legislatures, in 2004 the Williams administration 
amended the House of Assembly Act to require a general 
election every fourth October, unless the government 
is defeated earlier in the House on a confidence matter.
There is relatively little that opposition members can 
do to restrict the actions of a premier who has a majority 
of seats. In the 18 general elections held between 1949 and 
2007 there was only one minority outcome (1971, which 
resulted in another election five months later). Since 
Confederation, the province has experienced prolonged 
control by the Liberals (1949-1971, 1989-2003) and the PCs 
(1972-1989, 2003-) to such an extent that when a governing 
party has been re-elected it has averaged control of 80 per 
cent of the seats. The size of such majorities, such as the 
Williams-led PCs winning a super majority of 44 of 48 
seats in the 2007 general election, means that there are 
very few non-government members and consequently 
less scrutiny of government decisions. 
The Official Opposition is therefore often a small 
group of overwhelmed MHAs while a third party, if 
one exists, is a fringe organization. Opposition MHAs 
may find themselves responsible for multiple critic 
portfolios and it is unrealistic that they can be sufficiently 
informed about myriad topics or fully attend to all of 
their expected duties. The leader of the third party is 
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especially stretched, being unable to delegate speaking 
time, committee work or House leader duties. 
There is a significant workload imbalance, whereby 
ministers and opposition MHAs may feel overwhelmed, 
while some government backbenchers have little to do 
in the House other than to praise the budget or speak 
on matters concerning their electoral districts. The low 
number of opposition MHAs also makes it difficult to 
keep discussion going. For instance during committee 
of the whole, debate may continue as long as there is 
an intervening speaker every 10 minutes, meaning that 
to prolong discussion the opposition members must 
alternate talking. Sometimes the Speaker bends the 
rules to extend an opposition MHA’s speaking time to 
help compensate for that party’s lack of members. 
Most of the interaction between government and 
opposition members is restricted to the chamber. Staff in 
the premier’s office may chat with staff in the opposition 
parties, such as at scrums after question period, but 
the premier rarely meets with the other party leaders. 
Courtesy calls may be initiated by the premier’s staff 
to inform the opposition of a government decision, but 
sometimes this occurs moments before the premier 
makes a public announcement stating that consultation 
has taken place. Letters written by opposition members 
to the premier are unlikely to receive a substantive 
response. There is no interaction between the cabinet 
secretariat and the opposition, other than when the 
governing party initiates a briefing on a significant 
issue, which may be delivered by the Clerk of the 
Executive Council on short notice in an attempt to get 
the opposition onside. 
The small size of the opposition therefore increases 
the burden of scrutiny on journalists, academics and, 
lately, on political bloggers. However compliance 
makes life easier and the media tends to back off 
when the premier becomes aggressive. On a number 
of occasions Williams publicly berated inquisitive 
or opinionated journalists with CBC radio, CBC TV, 
The Independent (now defunct), and VOCM, and then 
implemented a communications moratorium with them 
and/or their employers. McCorquodale’s observation 
that for “most of the media, news originates with the 
press release, the press conference, or the daily sittings 
of the House of Assembly” is, sadly, still valid.28 
Conclusion
In many respects parliamentary democracy in 
Newfoundland and Labrador is failing to meet modern 
standards. Historians would surely point to its democratic 
struggles whilst decorum in the chamber is top of mind 
for most visitors. But there are currently serious political 
problems that, if not addressed, will continue to sustain 
an executive dominance that is inconsistent with modern 
democratic principles that themselves are witnessing a 
centralization of power in Westminster governments.
Three themes are of primary concern. The first is an 
elected premier’s unyielding control of the provincial 
government. Lopsided majorities, harsh party 
discipline, overwhelmed opposition parties, backroom 
pluralism, tepid journalism and unproductive committees 
are all symptomatic of a system that is failing to keep the 
executive accountable. This is a self-sustaining situation, 
for just as the lack of criticism contributes to the premier’s 
celebrity status and that celebrity contributes to his or her 
power, the general lack of policy alternatives contributes to 
a groupthink of infallibility. The conclusion McCorquodale 
reached over two decades ago that “it would be more 
democratic and effective if the executive could carry its 
legislative branch with it as partner not adversary” is just as 
relevant today.29
The second theme is the declining relevance of the 
legislature. The House is closed 88 percent of the year and 
talk radio has effectively replaced it as the people’s voice. 
Legislation is not sufficiently scrutinized: the committee of 
the whole is greatly overused, there are too few opposition 
MHAs to assess bills sufficiently, and standing committees 
are embarrassingly underused to the point of being 
dysfunctional. Backbench government MHAs have such a 
limited role that they are both overpaid and underworked: 
they routinely vote with their party, they rarely speak in 
the chamber, they do not introduce private member’s bills, 
they do not always attend the House when it is sitting, they 
do not represent a large number of constituents, and they 
get paid extra for the little bit of additional duties that they 
have. That the legislature’s shortcomings have persisted 
suggests a degree of indifference among the public. 
A final, but perhaps most critical, theme is the 
politics of deference towards charismatic power-
hungry elites and an outdated paternalistic ethos. 
Backbenchers, bureaucrats and journalists are scared to 
be on the wrong side of the executive for fear of harsh 
repercussions that can harm their careers. A massive 
spending scandal in the legislature occurred because, 
unlike Peter Cashin had done years before, nobody 
in the legislature had the courage or whistleblower 
protections to speak up about questionable expenses. 
Political participation is sufficiently limited that 
interest groups prefer to meet behind closed doors 
and family networks continue to hold considerable 
sway within party politics. There is a historical pattern 
of democratic fragility and of Newfoundlanders and 
Labradorians trusting elites to represent their interests.
This is not to say that gradual progress is not 
occurring in the House of Assembly. The influence 
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of religion has diminished and women are gradually 
assuming more powerful positions. MHAs and their 
staff provide important assistance services for their 
constituents. Financial systems in the legislature are 
now of a professional standard. House proceedings and 
management commission meetings are available on 
television and online. That a similar spending scandal was 
subsequently uncovered in Britain and Nova Scotia, and 
that in May 2010 the auditor general was barred in Ottawa 
from reviewing parliamentarians’ expenses, indicates that 
the Newfoundland legislature’s accountability problems 
are hardly unique. Furthermore premiers tend to be 
exceedingly popular long into their tenures. But the fact 
remains that policy alternatives are primarily discussed in 
cabinet and within the bureaucracy, which are secretive; 
in the media, which leans towards sensationalism 
and government propaganda; and, for 45 days a year, 
in meetings of all members of the legislature such as 
question period rather than in smaller specialist groups. 
Strengthening the quality of political decision-making 
in Newfoundland politics is important because, as one 
MLA put it, the House plays such an integral role in 
Newfoundlanders’ and Labradorians’ lives, whether they 
know it or not.
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